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The Great Depression:
Three Major Themes from
Selected Readings
by Ben H ussmann
For students of twentieth-century American history, the era of the Great
Depression stands as an economic, political, and social Great Divide. On
one side-prior to the Depression- lay a period of conservatism where
business concerns dominated major economic and political institutions.
On the other side-subsequent to t he Depression-is a new period of
liberalism, a period where government and special interest groups have actively sought a balance between business interests and public concerns. According to Robert S. McElvaine:
No period in American history has more to say to us than does the Depression decade.
Events in those years have determined the direction of our social and economic policies,
our relationship to our government, and ou r political alignments ever since (1984, p. xiii).

Because the Great Depression years were such a watershed in American
history, they have beenthe subject of intense scrutiny in a vast amount of
scholarship. The personalities of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt,
their policies and programs, the ideologies from which these programs
arose, the changing political alignments, and the rise of the New Deal coalition are fully represented in Depression and New Deal scholarship. Yet,
at the core of these developments remains an economic calamity of overwhelming proportions. The Depression is the subject of such intense
scrutiny precisely because the American economy collapsed, ushering in
an era of change. The collapse of the economy brought immense suffering and hardship to millions of Americans; the severity of this crisis
necessitated the dramatic institutional reforms which have endured to this
day.
Three conclusions about the Great Depression warrant examination and
defense:
1. The Great Depression was the result of an unstable economic
structure which was toppled by the Crash of 1929.
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2. The dominance of traditional classical economic theories prevented
Hoover and Roosevelt from enacting the measures needed to lift
the nation out of the Depression.
3. The New Deal was an economic failure, but was an era of real
and true reform in America.
These conclusions are drawn from selected works on the Depression and
the New Deal. John Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash 1929 (1961) examines those factors which underlay the Crash and subsequent economic
collapse. McElvaine's overview of the Depression years emphasizes the
social and political changes which occurred during this period. The ideas
and ideologies which influenced the New Dealers are thoroughly treated
by Theodore Rosenof (1975). The volumes edited by Alonzo Hamby (1981)
and Harvard Sitkoff (1985) are useful compendia of the broad range of
New Deal historiography.

Unstable Economic Structure
Widespread support exists for the conclusion that the Great Depression
resulted from an unstable economy which was toppled by the Crash of
1929. The dramatic events on Wall Street in October 1929 are sometimes
believed to have been the primary cause of the Depression. This is an erroneous belief. Galbraith, the noted Harvard economist, concludes his
study of the Crash by analyzing five fundamental weaknesses in the
economy. Galbraith asserts that the Crash brought these weaknesses to the
fore and magnified their deleterious effects upon the economy (1961, pp.
94, 182-190).

Galbraith cites a distribution of income skewed toward upper income
brackets as a fundamental weakness in the economy. Given that the
wealthiest five percent of the population received roughly one-third of all
personal income, the American economy was dependent on a high level
of investment, a high level of luxury consumption, or both, to maintain
prosperity. Galbraith's study shows that wealthy speculators were likely to
have suffered heavy losses in the Crash and were thus unable to maintain
their high levels of investment and consumption, thereby depressing aggregate demand.
Following the Crash, a weak corporate structure functioned to escalate
the deflationary spiral. During the speculative orgy on Wall Street in 1928
and 1929, several hundred investment trusts were formed. The trusts often
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held large segments of industrial stocks that were purchased with borrowed fund s; these trusts held no physical assets of their own. The Crash reduced the value of their holdings to the point where debt repayment became
impossible. This meant further dumping of stocks and a continuing contraction of the money supply as banks refused to loan funds to insolvent
ventures.
So too, the nation's banking system was fragile and subject to panics.
Banks could not collect on defaulted corporate or speculative loans fo llowing the Crash, and often defaulted themselves. Because deposits were uninsured, the fear of losing one's assets in an insolvent bank caused depositors
to panic. The rush to withdraw savings led to an epidemic of bank closings. (See Amdahl, this volume.)
The United States economy was also weakened by the dubious state of
the foreign balance of payments. The U.S. remained a net exporter in the
1920s. In order to balance their accounts with the U.S., foreign nations
had to either transfer gold to the U.S. or sell bonds in the United States
to secure American currency. Limited gold supplies made selling bonds
the preferable option. However, when the high Smoot-Hawley Tariff was
enacted in 1930, foreign nations found themselves unable to export to the
United States and unable to meet their bond obligations. The result was
that many American investors and banks found themselves holding
worthless foreign bonds. Speculation in foreign bonds was as disastrous
as speculation in the stock market.
Finally, Galbraith derides President Hoover and America's business
leaders and economists for their lack of economic intelligence. He believes
that many of the decisions and pronouncements made by these leaders
aggravated the deteriorating economic situation. Overly optimistic
economic forcasts prior to the Crash and Hoover's insistence on a balanced budget are roundly criticized by Galbraith. It seems that only courtesy
prevents Galbraith from using the term ignorant in his analysis of the actions of these elites.
The general history of the Depression by McElvaine echoes Galbraith's
assertions about an unsound economy. McElvaine gives a larger role to
the weakness of the agricultural sector than does Galbraith. He also notes
that productivity was increasing faster than wages in the years prior to the
Crash. Hence, rising inventories led to a recession in early 1929-another
sign of weakness.
The views of Galbraith and McElvaine reflect the general consensus
among scholars that a fundamentally unstable economy was thrown from
its moorings by the Crash of 1929.
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The Limitations of Orthodoxy
The second major conclusion, that the dominance of traditional classical
economic theories prevented Hoover and Roosevelt from enacting the
measures necessary to lift the nation out of the Depression, is supported
by overwhelming evidence.
It would be foolish to argue that Herbert Hoover was not bound by
classical economic theories. Both the man's rhetoric and his policies reflect
his orthodoxy. The writings of Galbraith and McElvaine prove instructive
on this point. Galbraith is extremely critical of Hoover's resolute adherence
to classical measures for aiding the economy: express optimism, balance
the budget, and raise the tariff. (Doctrinaire laissez-faire advocates would
object to the tariff as a hindrance to free trade, but by 1930 protective tariffs
were a well-established feature of American business capitalism.) Galbraith
claims Hoover's policies represented the "triumph of dogma over thought"
(1961, p. 191).
McElvaine is also critical of Hoover's policies, but he is more forthright
in recognizing that Hoover's actions were consistent with the prevalent
economic theories of the time. When Hoover attempted to speed recovery,
his measure was an extremely conservative device: the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (RFC). The RFC made government-backed loans to
banks and other large industrial enterprises in an effort to provide investment capital. The structure reflects Hoover's belief that if business was
confident, the economy would rebound. However, the RFC failed to increase investment to the necessary levels. Hoover failed to realize that Say's
Law is fallacious: supply does not create its own demand. Businesses were
unwilling to increase production because consumers were unable to buy
what was being produced. Hoover's ideological beliefs led to businessoriented policies incapable of yielding recovery.
To argue that Franklin Roosevelt was bound by othodox and conservative economic theories may seem imprudent. Roosevelt's New Deal was
widely assailed by conservatives of the period for its abandonment of
classical economic theories (see Robert A. Tuft in Hamby, 1981, pp. 29-37).
The persistent aura of the New Deal is one of liberal reform of social and
economic institutions. Indeed, the introduction to this paper refers to the
New Deal as a watershed in the origins of modern American liberalism
and the mixed economy. It would seem inconsistent to now argue that
Roosevelt and the New Dealers were tradition-bound and conservative.
In reality, there is no inconsistency. Admittedly, the New Deal broke with
many traditions and set many precedents in social welfare legislation. The
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Social Security Act and the Wages and Hours Act are realities which cannot be dismissed. However, the conclusion under consideration states that
Roosevelt was constrained by conservative classical economic theories and
that he was thus unable to enact measures which would produce economic
recovery. Of concern here are Roosevelt's economic beliefs and those of
New Deal policy-makers, not New Deal legislation. Theodore Rosenof
(1975) has examined the words and policies of New Dealers and has written what is, in essence, an intellectual history of the New Deal. Rosenof
concludes that while Roosevelt and his advisers held beliefs about curing
the Depression which were different from those of Hoover, they were
prevented from fully enacting these cures by their adherence to classical
economic dogmas, most specifically the doctrine of balanced government
budgets.
According to Rosenof, whereas Hoover saw the road to recovery in restoring business confidence, the New Dealers saw the necessity of increasing
mass purchasing power. Several New Deal agencies were established to
achieve that end, but each reflected a decided uneasiness about fundamentally redistributing the nation' s wealth. For example, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act sought to raise farm incomes but was financed by a
regressive tax on processors, negating its redistributive aspects. So too, New
Deal relief and public works efforts were always viewed as "emergency"
measures (Rosenof, 1975, p. 54). Roosevelt shared Hoover's disdain for
the dole. The National Recovery Administration, the New Deal agency
designed to harmonize relations between labor and management, was
dominated by business interests as was the RFC, and because wage increases
were tied to price increases under NRA codes, purchasing power was not
increased notably by the NRA.
Roosevelt's desire to balance the budget is primarily responsible for his
reticence in whole-heartedly pursuing policies to increase mass purchasing power. When conditions improved in 1936 and early 1937, Roosevelt
hastened to cut government spending in order to achieve a balanced budget.
The result was a sharp economic downturn in 1937 and 1938. Rosenof
believes that if New Dealers had analyzed their spending efforts, they would
have realized it was possible to spend themselves out of the Depression
(1975, p. 112). John Maynard Keynes, the seminal British economist, was
unsuccessful in showing Roosevelt that recovery would result from massive
increases in government spending and concomitant tax cuts. Roosevelt could
not accept such budget-busting fiscal policies.
James MacGregor Burns (in Hamby, 1981, pp. 123-140) is also critical
of Roosevelt's adherence to orthodox prescriptions for recovery. Burns
believes that hesitant advisers and political expediency may have discourag-
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ed Roosevelt from adopting a Keynesian fiscal policy, but he gives greater
weight to the possibility that the president's intellect was simply unable
to comprehend the efficacy of such a policy.
New Deal improvisations, while certainly more active than Hoover's orthodoxy, were restrained by the Roosevelt administration's fiscal conservatism and deep beliefs in balanced budgets. As Rosenof declares, the New
Deal failed, "to transcend the folklore of capitalism" (1975, p. 132).

Economic Failure, Social Reform
According to the third and final conclusion, the New Deal was a failure
economically, but was an era of real and true reform in American institutions. This conclusion is actually an amalgamation of two separate assertions. The first-that the New Deal failed economically-is evident. Key
economic indicators such as Gross National Product did not return to preDepression levels until 1941 when the Roosevelt administration adopted
a Keynesian fiscal policy as large military expenditures pulled the economy
out of the Depression.
However, to say that the New Deal failed economically is not to say that
the New Deal was a complete failure. Indeed, McElvaine's history of the
period is very sympathetic to the New Deal, yet he states, "For all it did,
for all it changed, the New Deal never succeeded in its primary goal: ending the depression;' (1984, p. 337).
The second aspect of this conclusion-that the New Deal was an era
of real reform of American institutions-is a matter of spirited debate
among historians. Indeed, historians cannot even agree on which interpretations are in the ascendancy. Hamby introduces his edition of several
analytical essays by asserting that a sympathetic, liberal consensus
dominates New Deal scholarship (1981, p. 1). Conversely, the eminent New
Deal historian William Leuchtenburg claims that recent New Deal
historiography is generally negative and critical (in Sitkoff, 1985, pp.
211-212).
What then are the major lines of debate in New Deal historiography?
The volumes edited by Sitkoff and Hamby show that those who support
the New Deal face three types of critiques: the intellectual, the conservative,
and the radical New Left critique.
Before examining these critiques we should note some of those historians
who are inclined to judge the New Deal favorably. Especially prominent
in this group are Frank Freidel and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (in Hamby)
and Richard Kirkendall, Robert Bremner, and William Leuchtenburg (in
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Sitkoff). These writers are especially pleased with Roosevelt' s willingness
to implement reform legislation in support of the laborer, the aged, and
the disabled. They see Roosevelt as a pragmatic experimenter who sought
to redress the imbalance between business interests and the ' 'common
man' s" rights. They praise Roosevelt for his attempts to reform capitalism
and prevent a fascist revolution as occurred in Europe (see Kirkendall).
Schlesi nger says that FDR was the first president to judge his policies according to their effects on the people and not according to their conformity to economic theories (in Hamby, p. 120).
The intellectual critique is so named because Roosevelt is attacked for
his lack of intellectual and doctrinal consistency. In a sense, Roosevelt is
criticized for the same characteristic that supporters praise: flexibility of
mind and measures. Whereas supporters see Roosevelt as a pragmatic experimenter, the critics of his intellect see an unsystematic improviser. Burns
and Rosenof typify this school of thought.
The conservative critique is essentially a political attack, not objective
historical analysis. This is illustrated by an excerpt from a 1939 radio address by Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio (in Hamby, 1981, pp.
29-37). Taft presented a contemporary criticism of New Deal economic
activism, claiming the long list of New Deal legislation was creating a
chaotic atmosphere in which business leaders would not invest. This critique is an outgrowth of orthodox economic theory and the "confidence"
cures those theories entail. Hoover and Taft are ideological soul-mates with
regard to the conservative critique. (It is interesting to note that in the age
of 1980s neo-conservatism, neither the 1981 Hamby volume nor the 1985
Sitkoff edition contains a more recent conservative critique of the New
Deal.)
The last of the critiques of the New Deal is the socialist view of the New
Left historians. Ronald Radosh (in Hamby, 1981, pp. 39-57) presents this
view. He sees the reforms of the New Deal as mythical, not actual. The
New Deal is seen as a concerted effort by business and government to implement a corporate capitalist system where the interests of big business
would be protected. In this view, the New Deal prevented more radical
reforms from being enacted. Radosh cites corporate support for reform
measures (e.g. Gerard Swope of General Electric) as evidence of this corporatist conspiracy (p. 44ff). He feels those historians who support the
Roosevelt program, especially Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., suffer a "false consciousness'' (p. 56).
The historiographic camps have been surveyed and the common critiques of the New Deal outlined. It is now necessary to support the conclusion that the New Deal was an era of meaningful reform. An argument
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in the form of reductio as absurdum will best serve the purposes of refuting
the criticisms levelled against the New Deal.
First, it may be said the intellectual critique begs the question. The conclusion states that there was meaningful reform while the intellectual critics
charge that these reforms were unsystematic. So what? The desire of some
historians to be able to neatly classify government actions according to
theoretical models in no way negates the meaningful and salutary effects
of such legislation as the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, and the
Wages and Hours Act.
Secondly, the conservative critique is reduced to an absurdity when one
considers the origins of the Crash and of the Depression. The conservatives
argue that nothing needed to be done to resurrect the economy, saying that
business confidence would, in time, have restored prosperity. Can these
conservatives explain why, during the extremely confident years of the late
1920s, the economy was so unstable and why the market plummeted? As
to the view that "in time" the economy would right itself, conservatives
would do well to remember John Maynard Keyne's remark that "In the
long run we are all dead" (1924, p. 88).
Finally, the New Left critics seem to be pract1cmg poor historical
philosophy and methodology when they assign motives to historical personages when it is very likely that those persons held no such motives. To
lambast Franklin Roosevelt for not being a socialist is certainly a questionable practice. To assert that a business-government conspiracy prevented
more radical reforms desired by the electorate is to ignore the fact that
socialist electoral support declined from 1932 to 1936. As Kirkendall writes,
"The American voters chose Roosevelt, not revolution" (in Sitkoff, 1985,
p. 15).
The following quote from Leuchtenburg succinctly states the nature and
extent of New Deal reforms:
What then did the New Deal do? It gave far greater amplitude to the national state,
expanded the authority of the presidency, recruited university-trained administrators,
won control of the money supply, established central banking, imposed regulation
on Wall Street, rescued debt-ridden farmers and homeowners, built model communities,
financed the Federal Housing Administration, made federal housing a permanent
feature, fostered unionization of the factories, reduced child labor, mandated minimum
working standards, . . . introduced the welfare state with old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and aid for dependent children, ... changed the agenda of American
politics, and brought about a Constitutional Revolution (in Sitkoff, 1985, p. 228).
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Summary
The era of the Great Depression, despite its significance in the development of modern economic, social, and political institutions, is often viewed simplistically. Many people believe that the Crash of October 1929 was
the fundamental cause of economic collapse, that Franklin Roosevelt was
not bound by capitalist orthodoxy, and that the implementation of New
Deal relief programs pulled the economy from the depths of Depression.
This paper has shown that such beliefs reflect an unsophisticated understanding of the nature of the causes and attempted cures of the Depression. Examination of a sample of Depression-era scholarship shows the
following to be true. The fundamental cause of the Depression was not
the Crash but a structurally unsound economy. The Crash triggered the
collapse; it did not cause it. Franklin Roosevelt was essentially a fiscal conservative in the same vein as Herbert Hoover. The relief and recovery programs initiated by Roosevelt were never implemented on the scope necessary
to end the Depression because of Roosevelt's aversion to deficit spending.
Though the New Deal programs failed to fully revive the economy, many
important and beneficial laws and programs launched under the banner
of the New Deal remain integral facets of modern American life. These
points correct common misconceptions about the Depression and are important to remember to gain an accurate perspective on the events of the
1930s.
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